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The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Center
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INFORMATION BULLETIN
Microsoft Predictable Name Pipes In Telnet
June 11, 2001 18:00 GMT Number L-092
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: The Microsoft Telnet service has seven vulnerabilities in
operational usage. These vulnerabilities exist due to the manner
in which telnet is started and corollary procedures.
PLATFORM: Windows 2000
DAMAGE: Two vulnerabilities, through the misuse of initialization pipes,
allow a malicious party to elevate their privileges. Four
vulnerabilities allow the potential of denial of service (DoS)
attacks. A final vulnerability can cause exposure of Guest
accounts on the server. For all vulnerabilities the mitigating
factor is that the malicious party must have local access
capability.
SOLUTION: Apply the patch provided by Microsoft.
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VULNERABILITY The risk is MEDIUM. This information has been made publicly
ASSESSMENT: available. Additionally, there is a wide range of
vulnerabilities affecting the telnet service.
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[****** Begin Microsoft Bulletin ******]
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Predictable Name Pipes Could Enable Privilege Elevation
via Telnet
Date: 07 June 2001
Software: Windows 2000
Impact: Privilege elevation, denial of service,
information disclosure
Bulletin: MS01-031
Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-031.asp.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue:
======
This bulletin discusses a total of seven vulnerabilities affecting
the Windows 2000 Telnet service. The vulnerabilities fall into three
broad categories: privilege elevation, denial of service and
information disclosure.
Two of the vulnerabilities could allow privilege elevation, and have
their roots in flaws related to the way Telnet sessions are created.
When a new Telnet session is established, the service creates a named
pipe, and runs any code associated with it as part of the
initialization process. However, the pipe's name is predictable, and
if Telnet finds an existing pipe with that name, it simply uses it.
An attacker who had the ability to load and run code on the server
could create the pipe and associate a program with it, and the Telnet
service would run the code in Local System context when it stablished
the next Telnet session.
Four of the vulnerabilities could allow denial of service attacks.
None of these vulnerabilities have anything in common with each
other.
- One occurs because it is possible to prevent Telnet from
terminating idle sessions; by creating a sufficient number of such
sessions, an attacker could deny sessions to any other user.
- One occurs because of a handle leak when a Telnet session is
terminated in a certain way. By repeatedly starting sessions and then
terminating them, an attacker could deplete the supply of handles on
the server to point where it could no longer perform useful work.
- One occurs because a logon command containing a particular
malformation causes an access violation in the Telnet service.
- One occurs because a system call can be made using only normal
user privileges, which has the effect of terminating a Telnet
session.
The final vulnerability is an information disclosure vulnerability
that could make it easier for an attacker to find Guest accounts
exposed via the Telnet server. It has exactly the same cause, scope
and effect as a vulnerability affecting FTP and discussed in
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-026.
Mitigating Factors:
====================
Privilege elevation vulnerabilities:
- Because the attacker would need the ability to load and run code
on the Telnet server, it is likely that these vulnerabilities could
only be exploited by an attacker who had the ability to run code
locally on the Telnet Server.
- Administrative privileges are needed to start the Telnet service,
so the attacker could only exploit the vulnerability if Telnet were
already started on the machine.
Denial of service vulnerabilities:
- It would not be necessary to reboot the server to recover from any
of these vulnerabilities. At worst, the Telnet service would need to
be restarted.
- None of these vulnerabilities could be used to gain additional
privileges on the machine; they are denial of service vulnerabilities
only.
Information disclosure vulnerability:
- The vulnerability could only be exploited if the Guest account on
the local machine was disabled, but the Guest account on a trusted
domain was enabled. By default, the Guest account is disabled.
Patch Availability:
===================
- A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the
Security Bulletin
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms01-031.asp
for information on obtaining this patch.
Acknowledgment:
===============
- Guardent (www.guardent.com) for reporting the two privilege
elevation vulnerabilities and one of the denial of service
vulnerabilities.
- Richard Reiner of Securexpert (www.securexpert.com) for reporting
one of the denial of service vulnerabilities.
- Bindview's Razor Team (razor.bindview.com) for reporting one of
the denial of service vulnerabilities.
- Peter Grundl for reporting one of the denial of service
vulnerabilities.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED
"AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT
SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL,
LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT
CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING
LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.
[****** End Microsoft Bulletin ******]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft Corporation for the
information contained in this bulletin.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Center, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
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employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
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